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monopolistic ﬁrms in a spatial economy formed by a large, high labor cost country and
a relatively small, low labor cost country. It is found that the decrease in transport costs
shifts ﬁrms towards the low production cost country. This process takes two diﬀerent
forms: in labor-intensive industries it leads to spatial fragmentation; in industries with
strong input-output relations, agglomerations are conserved, although they shift toward
the low labor cost country.
Keywords: Location; Intermediate goods; Agglomeration; Comparative advantage.
JEL classiﬁcation: F10, F12, R30
Author’s aﬃliation: Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, Technical University of Lisbon and
Research Unit on Complexity and Economics (UECE)
Address: ISEG, Rua Miguel Lupi, 20, 1249-078 Lisboa, Portugal
Tel. +351 21 3925916
Fax +351 21 3922808
Email <ppontes@iseg.utl.pt>
The author wishes to thank André Rocha, Filomena Garcia and Joana Pais for their helpful comments.
The usual disclaimer applies. This paper had the support of UECE.Agglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 2
1. Introduction
The general decrease in transport costs has caused a shift in productive activity
away from countries with large markets towards countries with low labor costs.
This process has two diﬀerent forms depending on the industry involved. In labor-
intensive industries (such as the textile industry), with a low intensity of vertical
linkages, it leads to spatial fragmentation. In this case, production is located in
a low-cost country, while distribution and design are placed close to the majority
of the consumers. By contrast, in sectors with strong input-output relations,
such as the engineering sectors (aerospace, car, pharmaceuticals, electronics), the
agglomerated pattern is maintained, but its location shifts toward a low production
cost country. This paper provides a theoretical rationalization for these trends.
It is widely acknowledged that, when choosing to locate, ﬁrms face a trade-
oﬀ between the location where access to consumers is maximized (usually the
central point of the market) and the location where the ﬁrm’s production costs are
minimized. MAYER (2006) dealt with this problem in the context of a duopoly in
a bounded linear space, where consumers are uniformly distributed and where, by
contrast, the distribution of unit production costs is non-uniform. He concluded
that with a globally convex distribution of production costs, there will be an
agglomerated equilibrium of locations that is intermediate between the central
point of the market and the minimum production cost point. He added that the
equilibrium locations of ﬁrms will be closer to the minimum production cost point
than to the central point, because a deviation from the former point would cause
al o s st oall consumers, whereas a deviation from the central point would harm
some consumers, while beneﬁting other consumers. He also concluded that a fallAgglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 3
in the unit transport costs of the consumer good would shift equilibrium locations
toward the point of minimum production costs.
Usually, diﬀerences in production costs across locations follow from the fact
that the supply of an input is localized, so that the ﬁrm not only has to pay the
price of the input at its source but also has to transport it over the distance between
the ﬁrm’s location and the input site. MAYER (2000) explicitly considers this
cause of spatial heterogeneity in production costs. However, the localized input is
often an intermediate good produced by upstream ﬁrms. Hence the location of the
input is endogenous and interdependent with the location of the consumer good
ﬁrms. HWANG and MAI (1989) model this interdependence through a two-stage
game involving two players that are successive monopolists. In the ﬁrst stage, the
upstream and the downstream ﬁrms simultaneously select locations in an interval
whose left boundary is a "port", through which a raw material is imported, and
whose right boundary is a "market" in which all consumers locate. In the second
stage, the ﬁrms set mill prices for the intermediate good and for the consumer
good. Subgame perfect equilibrium locations are derived for the ﬁrms, depending
on the unit transport costs of the three goods (raw material, intermediate good
and ﬁnal good) and on the input-output coeﬃcients. This model suﬀers from the
limitation that the source of the primary input is, by assumption, distinct from
the location of the consumers.
AMITI (2003) overcomes this limitation in the sense that she presents a gen-
eral equilibrium model with two countries (Home and Foreign) which are each
locations of both consumers and ﬁrms. There are two vertically-related industries,
Upstream and Downstream, which both operate under monopolistic Dixit-Stiglitz
competition. The industries use two primary factors, labor and capital, in diﬀer-Agglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 4
ent proportions: upstream ﬁrms are capital-intensive, while downstream ﬁrms are
labor-intensive. The countries diﬀer in terms of their factor endowments, so that
Home is abundant in capital while Foreign is abundant in labor. Besides primary
factors, each downstream ﬁrm uses a composite intermediate good made by the
products of each upstream ﬁrm, as in ETHIER (1982).
Apart from the case of autarky, where upstream and downstream ﬁrms divide
evenly between the two countries in order to serve the local consumers, there are
two possibilities. If transport costs are intermediate, all the ﬁrms (upstream and
downstream) agglomerate in one country, and the downstream industry supplies
the other country in manufactured goods through exports. Agglomeration occurs
in the Foreign (capital-abundant) country if the transport costs of the intermediate
good are low enough in relation to the transport costs of the ﬁnal good. Agglom-
eration takes place in the Home (labor-abundant) country if the transport costs
of the intermediate good are high enough and the existence of multiple locational
equilibria is possible. Finally, if both types of transport cost are low enough, the
upstream and downstream ﬁrms locate in diﬀerent countries, according to compar-
ative advantage, and a fragmented equilibrium emerges. However, AMITI (2005)
does not shed enough light on the basic trade-oﬀ that ﬁrms incur between produc-
tion costs (which are mainly felt by upstream ﬁrms) and market access (which is
mainly felt by downstream ﬁrms). The reason is that she focuses on the allocation
of each production stage to the country that is abundant in the factor (capital or
labor) used more intensively by that production stage.
In this paper, a partial equilibrium, game-theoretical model in the spirit of
HWANG and MAI (1989) is used, although it relates to a case where two countries
are both locations of consumers and ﬁrms. The countries are asymmetric both inAgglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 5
market size and unit production costs, i.e. the country with the higher number
of consumers also has higher production costs. There is a successive monopoly,
where an upstream ﬁrm uses labor to manufacture an intermediate good. This
input is transformed by a downstream ﬁrm into a ﬁnal good that the ﬁrm then
sells to ﬁnal consumers. The locational pattern depends on the interaction of unit
labor costs, vertical linkages and market access. An exact and detailed deﬁnition
of locational equilibria in the space of two parameters (intensity of vertical linkages
and transport cost) is produced, while the diﬀerentials in unit production costs
and market size are accounted for through an adequate speciﬁcation of parameters.
The results conﬁrm the position of AMITI (2005) as far as the occurrence of spatial
fragmentation in the upstream and downstream stages is concerned, but they diﬀer
from her work in other respects, since factor intensity does not play a major role
here. In this paper, agglomeration occurs for high transport costs (although in
multiple locations), instead of dispersion.
In section 2, a model for the location of vertically-linked ﬁrms is presented. In
section 3, the main conclusions are drawn.
2. The model
2.1. Assumptions
A spatial economy is deﬁned by the following assumptions:
1. There are two countries, labeled Home (H)a n dF o r e i g n( F). The number
of consumers in H is higher than in F: nh >n f. The distance between H
and F is normalized to 1. The distance between two points inside the same
country is zero.Agglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 6
2. Each consumer has a linear demand function q = a−bp,w h e r ep is a delivered
price.
3. There are two vertically-related ﬁrms. The upstream ﬁrm U transforms cu
units of labor into one unit of an intermediate good. The downstream ﬁrm
D uses α units of the intermediate good and cd units of labor to produce one
unit of the ﬁnal product that is sold to consumers. Firm U is more labor
intensive than ﬁrm D,s ot h a tw eh a v ecu >c d.
4. The intermediate good has a transport cost τ and the ﬁnal good has a
transport cost t. These costs vary in proportion, following the evolution of
the general transport infrastructure.
5. Each ﬁrm transports and delivers its product to its customers. Firm D sets
discriminatory prices ph,p f in each country, while ﬁrm U sets a delivered
price k for the intermediate good.
6. Country F is more labor-abundant than country H, so that the (parametric)
wages are such that wh >w f.
2.2. The structure of the game
The game has two players, namely the ﬁrms U and D, and three stages:
First stage Firms U and D simultaneously select locations xu,x d ∈ {H,F}.
Second stage Firm U sets a delivered price k for the intermediate good.
Third stage Firm D sets discriminatory prices ph,p f for the consumer good.Agglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 7
The payoﬀ (proﬁt) functions of the ﬁrms are:
πd (ph,p f,k,x u,x d)=nh (a − bph)[ph − αk − cdwxd − td(xd,H)] +
+nf (a − bpf)[pf − αk − cdwxd − td(xd,F)] (1)
πu (ph,p f,k,x u,x d)=α[nh (a − bph)+nf (a − bpf)] ·
·(k − τd(xd,x u) − cuwxu) (2)
where d(,) is the distance function, and wxd and wxu are the parametric wage
rates in the locations of the downstream and the upstream ﬁrms, respectively.
In order to concentrate our attention on the parameters that express the in-
tensity of vertical linkages (α) and the level of transport costs (t), the following
values are assigned to the parameters:
nh =1 .3 >n f =1(Country H is larger than Country F)( 3 )
cu =1 >c d =0(Upstream production
is more labor-intensive than downstream production)
wh =0 .3 >w f =0 .1 (Country F is
more labor-abundant than country H)
a = b =1
t = τ (Transport costs of the intermediate good
and of the ﬁn a lg o o dv a r yi np r o p o r t i o n )Agglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 8
With these speciﬁcations, 1 and 2 become
πd (ph,p f,k,x u,x d)=1 .3(1− ph)[ph − αk − td(xd,H)] +
+(1− pf)[pf − αk − td(xd,F)] (4)
πu (ph,p f,k,x u,x d)=α[1.3(1− ph)+( 1− pf)][k − td(xd,x u) − wxu]
(5)
The payoﬀ matrix of the location (ﬁrst-stage) game can be expressed by
Downstream
HF
Upstream Hπ u (H,H),πd (H,H) πu (H,F),πd (H,F)
Fπ u (F,H),πd (F,H) πu (F,F),πd (F,F)
(6)
2.3. Solving the game
In order to ﬁnd a subgame perfect equilibrium, each subsequent subgame that
begins in a cell of the payoﬀ matrix 6 is solved by backward induction, yielding
proﬁts πu (α,t) and πd (α,t) that depend only on the intensity of vertical linkages
and on transport costs. The details of these calculations are explained in the
Appendix. The proﬁts in the ﬁrst-stage game are:
Outcome xu = xd = HAgglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 9
πd (H,H)=( 0 .075α +0 .39131t − 0.25)
2 + (7)
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Outcome xu = F,xd = F
πd (F,F)=1 .3(0.025α +0 .35870t − 0.25)
2 + (13)

























In solving the game, the space of parameters is restricted to those values of α
and t that are low enough, so that the downstream ﬁrm sells positive amounts of
the consumer good in each country. In the Appendix, it is shown that the bounds










39130+25000α if α < 0.33229
0 <t<
(10−3α)2500
25000α+35869 if α > 0.33229
(15)
It is easy to check that, for all feasible values of α and t (as deﬁned in 15), the
following inequalities hold:
πd (H,H) >π d (H,F) from 7 and 9 (16)
πu (F,F) >π u (H,F) from 14 and 10 (17)
Assuming that the upstream ﬁrm locates in Home and that the downstream
ﬁrm locates in Foreign, the ﬁrst inequality means that, if ﬁrm D deviates to country
H, it eliminates the transport cost of the intermediate good and becomes closer to
the majority of the consumers, while production costs are kept constant. Also, the
second inequality means that, if ﬁrm U deviates to country F, it eliminates theAgglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 11
transport cost of the intermediate good and minimizes labor costs, while keeping
ﬁnal demand constant.
Together, inequalities 16 and 17 have two diﬀerent consequences. The ﬁrst
one is that (H,F) is never a Nash equilibrium of locations. The second one
is that the best reply correspondence of ﬁrm U is completely determined by
sign[πu (H,H) − πu (F,H)], while the best reply correspondence of ﬁrm D is also
completely determined by sign[πd (F,H) − πd (F,F)]. The equation system
πu (H,H) − πu (F,H)=0 (18)
πd (F,H) − πd (F,F)=0
has a unique feasible solution (in the sense of 15), namely
α =0 .13043 (19)
t =0 .2 (20)
It is simple to check that
πd (F,F) R πd (F,H) iﬀ α R 0.13043
πu (H,H) R πu (F,H) iﬀ t R 0.2
Hence, the regions where a diﬀerent type of locational Nash equilibrium holds
are bounded by 15, 19 and 20. These are plotted in Figure 1.
In order to interpret Figure 1, it should be borne in mind that, while t is the
transport cost of the consumer good, the product αt is the transport cost of the
intermediate good that is required to produce one unit of the consumer good. IfAgglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 12
Figure 1: Location equilibria in (α,t) space.
α and t are both low, the transport cost of the intermediate good is very low.
Hence, the upstream and the downstream ﬁrms choose separate locations (F,H),
the former seeking low production costs and the latter seeking high demand. The
opposite case is the one where both α and t are high, so that the transport cost of
t h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di sh i g h . I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eﬁrms agglomerate and there are
multiple equilibria (H,H) and (F,F), as was stressed by FUJITA (1981): locations
do not matter as long as the ﬁrms cluster and thus avoid the transport cost of the
heavy intermediate good.
On the other hand, if α is low and t is high, the transport cost of the consumer
good is high in relation to the transport cost of the input. Hence, locations are
driven by demand, so that both ﬁrms locate in the country that contains the
majority of the consumers. Finally, if α is high and t is low, the transport costAgglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 13
of the intermediate good is high in relation to the transport cost of the consumer
good. Hence, locations are driven by the minimization of production costs, so that
both ﬁrms locate in the low labor cost country F.
3. Concluding remarks
The model presented in the previous section enabled us to explain the trends
of the location of vertically-linked ﬁrms, whenever transport costs are reduced by
an improvement in the transportation system. When transport costs are high,
ﬁrms cluster in the country with the larger market (although agglomeration can
also occur in a peripheral country provided that vertical linkages are high enough).
Then, the decrease of transport costs shifts the location of the ﬁrms towards the
low-cost country. This process has two diﬀerent possible forms. If the intensity
of vertical linkages is low and the industry is labor-intensive (as in the textile
industry), the fall of transport costs leads to fragmentation: production is located
in the low-cost country, while the distribution and design are located in the larger
market. By contrast, sectors where the intensity of input-output relations is high,
such as the engineering sectors (as cars, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, electronics),
remain agglomerated, but the location of the cluster shifts towards the low-cost
country.
As a ﬁrst step, this paper is based on a numerical example. Its generalization
is left for further research.
Appendix: Solution of the price subgames and feasibility condition.Agglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 14
(i) In the case (H,H),t h ep r o ﬁt functions 4 and 5 become
πd (H,H)=1 .3(1− ph)(ph − αk)+( 1− pf)(pf − αk − t) (21)
πu (H,H)=α[1.3(1− ph)+( 1− pf)](k − 0.3) (22)
Maximizing 21 in relation to ph,pf, we obtain the prices of the consumer good:
pf =0 .5t +0 .5αk +0 .5 (23)
ph =0 .5αk +0 .5 (24)
Plugging 23 and 24 into 22 and maximizing the proﬁt function of the upstream







t +0 .15 (25)
Substituting 23, 24 and 25 in the proﬁt functions 22 and 21, we obtain the proﬁt
functions in terms of α and t, as given by 8 and 7. The condition of positivity of
the outputs sold in the two markets is such that
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(ii). In the case (H,F),t h ep r o ﬁt functions 4 and 5 become
πd (H,F)=1 .3(1− ph)(ph − αk − t)+( 1− pf)(pf − αk) (28)
πu (H,F)=α[1.3(1− ph)+( 1− pf)](k − t − 0.3) (29)
Maximizing 28, the delivered prices of the consumer good are obtained
pf =0 .5αk +0 .5 (30)
ph =0 .5t +0 .5αk +0 .5 (31)
Plugging 30 and 31 into the proﬁt function 28 and maximizing this proﬁt
function with relation to k, we obtain the price of the intermediate good






t +0 .15 (32)
Substituting 32, 30 and 31 into 29 and 28, we obtain the proﬁt functions in
terms of α and t given by 9 and 10.
As u ﬃcient condition so that the downstream ﬁrm sells a positive amount of
consumer good in each market in the case (H,F) is that the output sold in market
H (the distant market) is positive. Given 31 and 32, this condition means that








(34)Agglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 16
(iii) In the case (F,H), the proﬁt functions 4 and 5 become
πd (F,H)=1 .3(1− ph)(ph − αk)+( 1− pf)(pf − αk − t) (35)
πu (F,H)=α[1.3(1− ph)+( 1− pf)](k − t − 0.1) (36)
Maximizing 35 we obtain the prices of the consumer good in each country
pf =0 .5t +0 .5αk +0 .5 (37)
ph =0 .5αk +0 .5 (38)
Plugging 37 and 38 into 36 and maximizing the upstream proﬁt function, the
price of the intermediate good is obtained






t +0 .05 (39)
Substituting 37, 38 and 39 in the proﬁt functions 35 and 36, we obtain the
proﬁt functions in terms of α and t, as given by 11 and 12.
As u ﬃcient condition so that the output sold in each market is positive is




A necessary condition so that this inequality is met is
α<10 (41)Agglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 17
(iv) In the case (F,F),t h ep r o ﬁt functions 4 and 5 become
πd (F,F)=1 .3(1− ph)(ph − αk − t)+( 1− pf)(pf − αk) (42)
πu (F,F)=α[1.3(1− ph)+( 1− pf)](k − 0.1) (43)
Maximizing 42, we ﬁnd the prices of the consumer good
pf =0 .5αk +0 .5 (44)
ph =0 .5t +0 .5αk +0 .5 (45)
Plugging these prices into the proﬁt function 43 and maximizing it in relation







t +0 .05 (46)
If we substitute 44, 45 and 46 in the proﬁt functions 42 and 43, we obtain these
proﬁt functions in terms of α and t, as given in 13 and 14.
As u ﬃcient condition so that the downstream ﬁrm sells a positive amount in
each country is that




A necessary condition so that 47 is fulﬁlled is
α<10 (48)
(v) Comparing the bounding conditions 26, 33, 40 and 47 (together with 27, 34,
41 and 48), it is easy to conclude that a suﬃcient condition so that the downstreamAgglomeration and comparative advantage in vertically-related firms 18










39130+25000α if α < 0.33229
0 <t<
(10−3α)2500
25000α+35869 if α > 0.33229
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